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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
BOTHWELL AND SWANER COM- I
PANY, a corporation, and FLOYD
B. BOTHWELL, trustee, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
10072

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was originated by the Respondent in 1960
by the filing of a complaint in the District Court of Salt
Lake County to expropriate, by condemnation, lands of the
Appellants. Issues relating to the proposed use being pub-
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lie in nature, the public necessity of the acquisition, the
power of the Respondent to condemn the property of the
Appellants and just compensation to be exacted for the
expropriation were raised and submitted to trial. This
appeal is prosecuted to review the several judgments made
and entered by the trial court in the cause.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
Upon pre-trial hearing, the lower court entered its
Judgment of Right to Condemn in favor of Respondent (R.
51). Thereafter, upon trial of the issues of compensation
and damages, the trial court entered its judgment against
the Respondent and in favor of Appellants in the amount
of $185,000.00; said judgment failed to provide for or carry interest either before or after judgment. The Motion
of Appellants for a new trial on questions of the right to
condemn and compensation was, by the lower court, denied
on the 16th day of January, 1964. After several ancillary
hearings and upon motion of Respondent, the lower court
entered its Judgment of Condemnation on the 3rd day of
March, 1964, adjudicating the public use, the authority
therefor, and vesting in Respondent the absolute title in
and to the condemned premises of Appellants.
RELIEF SOUGHT
It is submitted by this appeal that the judgment of the
District Court entered on the verdict of the jury be reversed and the case remanded for new trial on the issues
of value and compensation.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
Additionally, it is contended that the judgment of condemnation of March, 1964, be reversed and the case be
remanded to the lower court with instructions to dismiss
the Respondent's complaint and the stated cause of action.
In the event the reliefs requested above are denied,
Appellants further seek judgment declaring their entitlement of interest payable by the Respondent at the Statutory rate from the date of entry of the judgment on the
verdict to the date of the deposit of monies made by Respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The property of Appellants, as to which condemnation
is sought, is described in the complaint of the Board of
Education filed in April, 1960 (R. 2-3). A large tract,
well known to inhabitants of Salt Lake City, the condemned
premises is situated between Eighth South and Ninth South
Streets in the City, the westerly property line thereof fronting upon Thirteenth East Street. The entire tract, prior
to the taking, comprised some 157,383 square feet, of which
the whole thereof was condemned (Tr. 26-29). For convenience at trial, the portion of the property abutting upon
13th East was referred to as Parcels A and B (Tr. 26-28),
and the southeasterly segment, abutting upon Sunnyside
Avenue on the north and 9th South Street on the south
was denominated Parcel C (Tr. 28-29). As of the date of
service of summons, Parcels A and B, comprising 74,356
sq. ft. more or less, were subject to R-5 use zone of Salt
Lake City, while tract C, encompassing 83,027 sq. ft. was
zoned R-2 (Tr. 26-29, 52-54, 73).
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The Appellants by their answer, denied the existence
of a public use, raised the further questions of public
necessity and lack of authority in law for the contemplated
use and prayed for a dismissal on the merits, or as an alternate, if such questions were resolved in favor of
the Board, that just compensation be thereupon adjudged
(R. 8-9,16-17, and 49-50).
Relative to the preliminary issues, interrogatories were
served upon and answered by the Board (R. 18-23); the
response indicated the proposed use to be in furtherance
of general "school needs", that the Board "had not made
final plans" for the use of Appellants' property, but that
an immediate need existed for the parking of 400 to 600
automobiles (R. 20-21). Appellants' motion for summary
judgment, founded upon the answers produced in discovery, was denied upon pre-trial hearing (R. 51-52), and
the Petition for interlocutory appeal lodged by Appellants
to review such ruling was by this Court denied on December 7, 1962 (See Sup. Ct. Dock. 9777). Upon further pretrial hearings, the power of the Board to condemn the lands
of Appellants was determined in the Respondent's favor
(R. 56-57, 75-76) and the cause was thereupon set for trial
by jury on the issues of value and compensation (R. 7678), damages having been deemed to have accrued as of
June 28,1960 (R. 78).
On November 18, 1963, a jury of eight was selected
and the trial affecting the issues of value began by the
presentation of Appellants' case in chief (Tr. 1-2, 24). It
was the theory of the landowners' case that under applicable zoning regulations, the highest and best use of the
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condemned portion zoned R-5, was multi-story apartments
with a potential capacity of 315 apartment units (Tr. 49,
54), the segment under R-2 zoning serving the collateral
needs of auto parking (Tr. 55, 90). Further, that although
the largeness in size and plottage of the entire tract made
it highly desirable and unique among land similarly zoned
within the City, market value was to be primarily gauged
by an examination and analysis of the sale of other properties (Tr. 66, 67, 104, 112).
Called as an evaluation witness for Appellants was
Grant E. Nielsen. His qualifications to render an opinion
on value were shown to be as follows:
a. A senior member of the American Society of Appraisers and President of the Utah Chapter (Tr.
42,44);
b. A realtor and broker in Salt Lake City since 1954
(Tr. 44);
c. A former general contractor and construction technician (Tr. 43);
d. A former staff appraiser for the Utah State Tax
Commission (Tr. 44);
e. Had testified as an expert witness in the courts
of Utah (Tr. 44);
f. Had appraised all types of use properties (Tr. 44);
g. Had been retained as a fee appraiser for such established clients as State Road Commission, Kennecott Copper Company, numerous school boards,
utility companies and others (Tr. 45-46).
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The witness, without objection rendered his opinion as
to highest and best use of the condemned property (Tr.
49).
After identifying the topic tract and establishing his
familiarity with it, he was asked his opinion of market
value on the target date (Tr. 66). At that juncture, counsel for the Board was permitted, over objection (Tr. 70),
an unlimited 'Voir doir" examination directed to the basis
of the witness' opinion (Tr. 66-71, 121-146) part of the
questioning being conducted without the presence of the
jury. Adduced at this examination, was the following testimony:
a. That the appraiser had considered numerous sales
of other property, among them being three transactions, which in his opinion, were comparable to
the considered land zoned R-5 (Tr. 66, 69, 105-106,
110,115,119);
b. Sale No. 1 involved property at Fourth Avenue
and B Street in Salt Lake City, took place in 1961,
and was subject to R-5 zoning (Tr. 108-110);
c. Sale No. 2 concerned land at South Temple and K
Street in the City, was consummated in 1962, and
was zoned R-5 (115-117);
d. Sale No. 3 embraced property at 50 South Ninth
East in the City, sale was made in 1962 and was
subject to the same zone, R-5 (118-119);
e. That in the appraiser's opinion, there had not been
a substantial change in market prices for R-5 prop-
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erty between the date of evaluation, June 28, 1960,
and 1961 or 1962, the dates of the sales elicited
(Tr. I l l , 116, 135);
f. The witness found no sales in 1960, which in his
opinion, were comparable to the condemned tract
(Tr. 137, 139);
g. On cross-examination and without the presence of
the jury, the witness acknowledged that other sales
of R-5 property had been transacted in 1960 within
the City, but that they were not sufficiently comparable, in his opinion, to be used (Tr. 127-133);
h. That each sale examined was compared with the
subject property for location, zoning, plottage, and
time of sale and weight given to it accordingly (Tr.
144);
i. That the value of unimproved real estate is determined by the market data or sales approach (Tr.
104).
After hearing such evidence, the trial judge found
such testimony to be "wholly speculative", that only those
sales "more favorable" and "more helpful" to the landowner were used by the witness to determine value and the
judge thereupon refused to allow the opinion of Mr. Nielsen to go to the jury (See Tr. 146-147).
Appellants then proceeded to call two additional witnesses to testify on value (Tr. 163, 183), but upon objection of the Board, the testimony of each was rejected by
the trial court as not having been founded upon proper
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basis and the same excluded was from the jury (Tr. 181,
190, 191). If received, the opinions of the witnesses proffered, respectively, were $542,160.00 and $596,000.00 (Tr.
175, 187). The landowners thereupon rested their case in
chief without any evaluation testimony being placed before
the trier of fact (Tr. 193).
Subsequent to the Board calling its first expert witness, Appellants requested and were granted permission
to reopen their case in chief to permit the testimony of one
of the landowners, Roy Bothwell (Tr. 200). After a hearing conducted without the presence of the jury, the witness
testified that the condemned property was not "worth less
than $525,000.00; absolute minimum, as to value" (Tr. 216).
Upon objection of counsel for the Board, the witness was
prohibited from explaining the basis of his conclusion
(Tr. 217). The evidence of Mr. Bothwell was received as
that of the landowner and not as a qualified and informed
opinion on market value (Tr. 204-208, 217).
The Board called two evaluation witnesses (Tr. 193,
202). A number of R-5 and R-6 sales were adduced in support of their opinions, the date of such transactions ranging from 16 months prior to the key date of evaluation (Tr.
255) to four months succeeding (Tr. 309); only one sale
was in the latter class. Over objection of Appellants' counsel (Tr. 274), one of the Board's witnesses was permitted
to render his opinion as to the market value of the property zoned R-2 without having preliminarily produced any
foundation therefor (Tr. 264-265). The Court received
evidence from the Board's last witness that sales of R-2
land transacted in January and July, 1958, as relevant and
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comparable to the subject tract on the key date, June 28,
1960 (Tr. 354). The value conclusions of the Respondent's
witnesses were $155,500.00 and $179,000.00, respectively
(Tr. 265, 312.) The verdict of the jury, returned into open
court on the 22nd day of November, 1963, was $185,000.00
(R. 134), and the judgment of the trial court thereon was
entered the same day.
On the 10th day of December, 1963, the Board filed
with the Clerk of the District Court a notice depositing
with said official the sum of $185,138.80 (judgment and
costs) (R. 138-139). Appellants objected to such deposit
and the amount thereof on the ground that the payment
tendered did not include interest on the judgment from the
date of its entry, November 23, 1963, to the date of deposit
at the statutory rate of 8% per annum. Upon hearing, the
objection was overruled and interest denied (R. 143). Notwithstanding such order, the Board on January 2, 1964,
filed an additional notice depositing ''under protest" the
sum of $1,662.35, representative of interest at 8% from
the date of judgment to the date of the additional deposit
(R. 140-141). The Appellants have not made application
to the lower court to withdraw or receive said moneys or
any part thereof.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY
IN PROHIBITING APPELLANTS' EVALUATION WITNESS, NIELSEN, FROM RENDER-
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ING AN OPINION ON THE MARKET VALUE
OF THE CONDEMNED PREMISES.
(a)

By the applicable standard, the witness was
well qualified to testify on market value.

At the trial on damages, Grant E. Nielsen, realtor and
appraiser of Salt Lake City, was called as the Appellants'
principal evaluation witness. Upon being sworn, the examination of the witness was at once directed to the general qualifications of the witness (Tr. 42-48). In addition
to an explanation of his education, training and experience
in the real estate community, Nielsen testified that he was
familiar with the condemned tract, that he had personally
inspected and viewed it, that he had been requested to
appraise the premises and that he had, in fact, formed an
opinion of its market value as of June 28, 1960.
Thereafter, Nielsen was asked his opinion as to the
highest and best use of the considered property; he responded, without objection by the Board, that the best use
was a "high-rise" multiple apartment site. Upon confirming this conclusion, the witness was asked for his opinion
on market value. Thereupon, counsel for the Board, over
objection, was allowed, under the pretense of voir doir, to
conduct a searching cross-examination of the substantive
basis for the expert's value opinion, specifically his analysis of comparable sales. The net effect of this untimely and
unfortunate interrogation was the trial court's declaration
that the witness was not qualified to render an opinion:
"It appears from his own testimony that his
opinion, based upon comparables in 1962, would be
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wholly speculative; would not be helpful to the jury
in determining comparable values. For that reason,
I am going to decline to permit the testimony to go
to the jury, unless he further qualifies on this
theory of comparable values." (Tr. 146.)
Based on an erroneous hypothesis, Nielsen was excluded from testifying on market value. For the trial court
to have so ruled was clear and unqualified error. The
function of the trial judge in receiving or rejecting the
opinion of a witness on market value is to adjudge, preliminarily, the competency of the witness by his training,
his educational achievements, his specialized knowledge of
the field or domain under inquiry, and his practical experience in the real estate and appraisal business. Board
of Regents of University of Arizona v. Cannon, 86 Ariz.
176, 342 P. 2d 207 (1959); Shelby County v. Baker, 110
So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1959). It is not his province to act as an
arbiter of fact, or to weigh the merits of the opinion testimony on a finely balanced scale; that assignment rests
solely with the jury. Webb V. Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corp., 9 U. 2d 275, 342 P. 2d 1094 (1959). Therein, it was
said:
«* * * When the subject under consideration involves some aspects of science, art, trade, or
learning about which the general knowledge of laymen is not sufficient to interpret and apply evidence accurately in the finding of facts and drawing conclusions, one who has acquired special knowledge of the subject through study, or experience
may be permitted to testify as an expert and give
his opinions in regard to it. * * *
«* * * So long as there is reasonable basis
shown to justify the trial court's permitting the
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witnesses to testify as experts, the testimony is allowed to come in as competent evidence. The qualifications of the witnesses then become one of the
factors for the jury to consider in determining the
weight to be given it." (Emphasis added.)
Indeed, the presentation, by the witness, of his analysis
of sales of other property, or the manifestation of the reasons generally underlying his opinion, is not a condition
precedent to the admissibility of an opinion. Such is the
plain meaning of this Court's holding in State of Utah v.
Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956). For that
matter, it was not until the decision in State of Utah v.
Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), that sales of comparable property were properly considered the subject of
inquiry at all, on direct examination; prior thereto, it had
been contended that questions relating to collateral sales
were reserved for cross-examination. In rejecting Nielsen's
testimony, the lower court disregarded the clear effect of
Tedesco.
The witness, Nielsen, on voir doir examination, stated
that he had examined, was familiar with, and had analyzed
a number of sales of other property, that he had utilized
and considered three (3) transactions in particular, in arriving at his opinion; as to the latter sales, the nature and
dates of each were declared. Even had the witness failed to
adduce one sale, his opinion, based upon general qualifications, should have been initially received for whatever
weight the trier of fact might accord to it. Mai V. Garden
City, 177 Kan. 179, 277 P. 2d 636; Dept. of Public Works
V. Divit, 182 N. E. 2d 749 (111. 1962); State of Montana V.
Peterson, 328 P. 2d 617 (Mont. 1958). The rule is set out
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in Board of Regents of University of Arizona V. Cannon,
86 Ariz. 176, 342 P. 2d 207 (1959) :
"* * * It is true that there are other elements which may be used to determine market value, including a knowledge of the sales prices of
other property similar in character and locality, but
we know of no rule which requires the use of this
element exclusively. If the witness testifying as to
market value bases his opinion upon a recognized
method of determining it which is of such a nature
that it is not a matter of common knowledge, but
results from special experience of training of the
witness, his opinion in the matter may be regarded
as expert. Upon cross-examination he may be questioned as to the extent of his knowledge of other
elements, and lack of such knowledge would be a
matter for the jury to consider in weighing the
value of the testimony. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)
Wigmore states the general maxim thusly:
"A sufficient qualification is usually declared
to exist where the witness is a resident, landowner,
or farmer, in the neighborhood." 3 Wigmore on
Evidence 44, Sec. 714 (3rd ed.).
Nielsen brought to the trial an abundance of personal
qualifications. President of the Utah Chapter of the American Society of Appraisers, former appraiser for the State
Tax Commission, a realtor and broker in Salt Lake City
for many years with an established appraisal clientel, Nielsen had qualified as an expert on market value in other
suits of like nature. Once having elicited his training, education, experience and knowledge of the subject property,
all objections to his opinion on value went to the weight
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rather than to its admissibility. Norman V. Utah Hotel
Co., 60 Utah 52, 206 Pac. 556 (1922).
It is elementary that the determination of whether a
witness is competent to record his opinion on land value
rests to a large extent, with the discretion of the trial court.
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. V. Nelson, 11 U. 2d
253, 358 P. 2d 81; Graham V. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot
Co., 79 Utah 1, 6 P. 2d 465. But a more important principle
is that the decision of the trial judge will not stand on
appeal if it is patent that prejudicial error was committed
or his discretion was abused. Garr V. Cranney, 25 Utah
193, 70 Pac. 853; Webb V. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.,
supra; Douglas County V. Myers, 201 Or. 59, 268 P. 2d 625.
Turner V. State Roads Comm. of Md., 213 Md. 428,
132 A. 2d 455 (1957) is a case in point. Coates was called
to testify in behalf of the landowners. He was an experienced realtor and broker of 20 years. On direct examination, the witness elicited four (4) sales of property which,
in his opinion, were comparable to the property which the
Roads Commission had condemned. The trial court ruled
that the testimony was vague and general and refused to
permit the appraiser to testify as to market value. The
Maryland Court reversed the ruling of the trial judge and
granted a new trial. In so doing, it declared:
"This Court has long held that while the admissibility of expert opinion evidence is largely
within the discretion of the trial court, it is always
subject to the review of the appellate court. * * *
(citing authorities.)
"We have concluded after a careful examination of the evidence that the trial court should not
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have excluded the opinion evidence of Mr. Coates.
* * * The evidence therefore shows not one
sale, but at least four sales with the year of sale
and sale price per acre. * * * We feel that
both property owners were possibly harmed by being denied the right to present Mr. Coates' testimony to the jury and that the exclusion of this evidence constitutes reversible error"
(Emphasis
added.)
In the case at bar, Nielsen testified of three (3) sales
which in his opinion were probative. The facts herein substantially parallel those in Turner v. State Roads Comm.
and, it is submitted, warrant and require the same treatment as therein given, namely, a new trial.
(b)

Contention that the Court's ruling did not
prevent the witness, Nielsen, from rendering an opinion (based on other grounds)
is erroneous.

It has been said that the ruling of the trial court barring Mr. Nielsen from imparting his opinion on market
value to the jury did not foreclose an opinion based on
general qualifications of the witness. At the hearing on
Appellants' motion for new trial, the trial court remarked:
"The court takes the view that market data
comparability is a matter which the court must consider in advance of testimony going to the jury.
"If it isn't helpful,
If it is so one-sided that
it a helpful standard, it
exclude it, but it wasn't
to prohibit the witness

the jury shouldn't hear it.
the court does not consider
is the duty of the court to
the intention of the court
from testifying from his
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general knowledge, his general examination, his
general opinion, as to values on the key date."
(Trans, of Proceeding—December 23, 1963, p. 11.)
There are at least two reasons why this statement affords no panacea to the otherwise erroneous decision of the
trial court in rejecting the opinion of Nielsen:
1. The comparative sale (or market data) approach
to market value is the paramount, the key, and
pragmatically the only test which can be utilized
in determining the market value of the condemned
property (unimproved and non-income bearing).
This approach hinges upon the application of the
"willing buyer—willing seller" test adopted by this
Court. Southern Pacific Co. V. Arthur, 10 U. 2d
306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State Road Comm. V.
Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963). Witness the statement appearing in the Appraisal
Manual of the American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers:
"The market data approach is essential in almost every appraisal of the value of real property.
*

*

*

"Why is market data good evidence of value?
Because it represents the actions of users and investers. * * * The market data approach recognizes that the typical buyer will compare asking
prices and work through to the best deal available.
In the market data approach the appraiser is an
observer of the buyer's actions." Appraisal of Real
Estate, American Institute, pp. 68, 319 (3rd ed.
1960).
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2. If the lower court found that Nielsen's testimony,
predicated upon a careful diagnosis of other sales,
would not be "helpful" to the jury, how, it is
queried, would an opinion founded on generalities
be "helpful" ? The question provides its own answer.
The position taken by the trial court herein was raised
and answered in Turner V. State Roads Coram, of Md., supra, discussed above. After commenting upon action of the
trial court in refusing to allow the witness, Coates, to testify on market value, the Court said:
"Appellee insists that the court did not decide
the witness could not qualify and the appellants
should have proceeded further to qualify the witness. We do not agree. Counsel had drawn from
the witness all information he had of comparable
sales and the court reiterated his original opinion
that Coates was not qualified. The excusal of the
witness at this juncture cannot be considered as an
abandonment to qualify him."
The error of the trial court in preventing Nielsen from
testifying on market value was prejudicial and warrants
a new trial on compensation.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY
IN DENYING ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF
SALES OF COMPARABLE PROPERTY PROFFERED BY THE APPELLANTS.
The witness, Nielsen, testified that upon his investigation of sales in the area, there were three (3) transactions
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which he utilized and considered comparable. See Brief
of Appellants, pp. 6, 7. In each instance, the sale was of
property situated in Salt Lake City, subject to the same
use zone as the condemned premises, and purchased for
multiple-apartment construction. The dates of the transactions were 1961 for Sale No. 1 and 1962 for Sales No. 2
and No. 3. The trial court found the sales to be too far
removed in point of time to be relevant, that the same
were the product of a biased witness and refused to receive
them as bearing upon market value as of June 28, 1960.
This is the comment of the trial judge:
"* * * Having taken only 1962 prices, and,
without having considered anything in 1960, the
court is of the view that he (Nielsen) considers the
1962 prices more favorable to the land-owner here
who called him to testify."
Apart from the statement falling in the category of a
commentary on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witness, the decision to reject the sales as
remote in time was prejudicial error.
By a chain of decisions, the law is well established in
this jurisdiction that sales of comparable property are admissible as bearing upon market value, State of Utah V.
Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953); State of Utah V.
Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956); Southern
Pacific Co. V. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960);
Weber Basin W. C. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d
862 (1959); State of Utah V. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317,
366 P. 2d 76 (1961); State of Utah V. Woolley,
et ux., 15 U. 2d
, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964), and their use
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is now common practice in the trial of land condemnation
suits.
Each of the sales proffered by the witness, Nielsen,
was consummated subsequent to the date of value in the
case. This should cause no alarm nor should that fact render them inadmissible. The preferred and majority rule
supports the introduction of similar sales of property, made
before or after the taking, which have a reasonable relationship to the status of the market at the date of assessment of value. Hance V. State Roads Comm. of Md., 221
Md. 164, 156 A. 2d 644; U. S. V. 63.04 Acres of Land, 245
F. 2d 140 (2 C. A., 1957). In Dorfmann V. State of New
York, 4 A. D. 2d 979, 167 N. Y. S. 2d 760, the admissibility
of a sale made two years after the date of acquisition was
approved and it was said by the New York Court:
"It seems reasonably clear that the sale was
made in good faith and in the ordinary course of
business. We find no case precisely in point where
testimony was received of a sale two years after
an appropriation but sales made prior to an appropriation for an even longer period of time have been
approved (Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood, 300
N. Y. 231, 90 N. E. 2d 53). The rule in Massachusetts is that testimony of after sales within a
reasonable time is admissible and we see no good
reason why the same rule should not apply in this
state, (citing authorities.)"
This Court has not had occasion to pass upon the
question, pointedly, although the sales under consideration
in State Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d
76, were transacted subsequent to the date of evaluation.
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(a)

It could not be said that sales occuring two
years after the date of value were, as a
matter of law, so remote as to have no probative value.

There is no magic standard by which a comparable
sale is determined. A host of factors, inclusive of size,
shape, zoning, and proximity of time and location, are to
be considered; the best that can be said is that comparability is dependent upon the conditions and circumstances
of each situation. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 439, Sec.
21.31 (3rd ed.). The time of sale, as an element itself, is
of moment in ascertaining whether the market conditions
between the two dates have fluctuated or substantially
changed. If such conditions have maintained a relative
consistency, the proffered sale should be admitted. Weber
Basin W. C. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862; City
of Chicago V. Vaccarro, 408 111. 587, 97 N. E. 2d 766. Placed
in the negative:
"Remoteness in point of time, however, will
condemn the evidentiary value of a sale only where
there has been such a change in conditions during
the interval as to make the sale an unreliable test
of value." 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 452, Sec.
21.31(2).
The witness for Appellants, Nielsen, testified that with
respect to comparable Sales Nos. 1, 2, and 3, there had
been no measurable shift of the market between the date
of condemnation (1960) and that of the respective sales
(1961 and 1962) (Tr. 112, 116, 135). Furthermore, Nielsen stated that his investigation did not disclose any sales
during 1960 which, in his opinion, were similar to the
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condemned tract (Tr. 137-139); at this point in the trial,
such testimony was undisputed as the Board had not yet
gone forward with its case. The foundation for time of sale
was therefore amply satisfied for the admission of each
of the proffered sales brought forth by Mr. Nielsen.
In rejecting the sales, the trial court expressed apparent concern over the remoteness of time involved. That
factor, standing alone, is of little consequence. Sales made
five years or more have been received, Taylor v. State
Roads Comm., 224 Md. 92, 167 A. 2d 127 (1961); Holcombe
V. City of Houston, 351 S. W. 2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961),
and a trial court was held to have abused its discretion in
rejecting sales made three years before the key date. Housing Authority of City of Little Rock v. Sparks, 234 Ark.
868, 355 S. W. 2d 166 (1962). Remoteness in time goes
not to the admissibility of the proffered sale, but rather
to its weight. Thus, in approving the use of a sale made
six and one-half years from the date of value, this Court
said:
"While we recognize that if a prior sale is too
remote in point of time, and changed conditions
have intervened so that the trial court thinks the
evidence has no probative value, he may sustain the
objection, we do not regard the instant situation as
falling within the classification. * * * The
more remote the time of the prior sale the less probative value it may have on the immediate situation,
but that goes to the weight of the evidence and not
its competency or its relevance/' (Emphasis ours.)
Weber Basin W. C. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347
P. 2d 862 (1959).
Any misgivings that the trial court may have had as
to the sales proposed by Appellants went to their weight
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and value, not the admissibility thereof. That the trial
court was in doubt about the accuracy of its ruling is evident from the transcript. After hearing all the evidence
including that of the Board, the court, on its own motion,
stated that it would permit Nielsen to testify on market
value, utilizing the proposed 1961 sale (No. 1 herein) as
a premise (Tr. 394, 395). After argument, the court reversed the prior pronouncement and held to its initial decision denying the admission of the opinion and sales of
Mr. Nielsen and denied Appellants' motion to reopen their
case in chief:
"The court having reconsidered the ruling
stated just prior to recess now believes that an
opinion by Mr. Nielsen based upon one comparable
would not be sound or justified or helpful to the
jury." (Tr. 398.)
In so doing, the trial court, again, indulged in the
weighing of evidence, the credibilty of the witness and the
relative merits of Nielsen's opinion. Such constitutes prejudicial error.
The Board of Education did not witness the difficulty experienced by Appellants in the presentation of its
evaluation witnesses. Firstly, the trial court reversed its
ruling that sales be introduced prior to the witness rendering his opinion; the matter of sales and their validity, it
was said, was for cross-examination (Tr. 264, 265). Secondly, the Board introduced into evidence sales of property
zoned R-2, which were transacted in January and July,
1958 (Tr. 354). If the trial court was concerned about the
remoteness of time accompanying the sales offered by Ap-
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pellants, 1958 sales offered by Respondent should have
caused equal anxiety.
Although the determination of comparability rests in
the first instance, within the discretion of the trial court,
State of Utah V. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953),
that discretion, if found to be erroneous or abused, will
be overturned. In Weber Basin W. C. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U.
2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 (1959), the trial court excluded a sale
of the condemned tract made six and one-half years prior
to the date of value. Such exclusion was found to be in
error, and served as a ground for the cause being remanded
for new trial. See also Housing Authority of City of Little
Rock V. Sparks, 234 Ark. 868, 355 S. W. 2d 166 (1962)
and Thompson V. State of Texas, 319 S. W. 2d 368 (Tex.
1958).
It is submitted that reasonable minds could not differ
that the sales proposed and offered by Appellants were,
in law, comparable, that the objections thereto went to
their weight and not admissibility and that the trial court
erred in refusing to receive the same.
POINT III.
BY THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT
TO ADMIT THE TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE LANDOWNERS,
A P P E L L A N T S WERE DENIED A FAIR
TRIAL.
(a)

The sole evaluation testimony admitted was
that of the landowner, himself.
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The Appellants, as landowners in condemnation, are
entitled to be compensated justly for the expropriation of
their property by the Board of Education. Art. 1, Sec. 22,
Utah Constitution; Shurtleff V. Salt Lake City, 96 Utah
21, 82 P. 2d 561; 78-34-10 (1) U. C. A. 1953. This requires
a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
The transcript of the testimony and evidence is undeniable that the error committed by the trial court, as
outlined in Points I and II of this Brief, worked to the
real prejudice of the Appellants. The aftermath of the
lower court's rulings excluding the testimony and opinion
of Nielsen, was that the landowners, who carry to the trial
the burden of proof, Tanner V. Provo Bench Canal & Irr.
Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584, failed in their effort to
place in evidence any testimony on market value. Not one
scintilla of expert evidence reached the trier of fact in
behalf of Appellants during the trial.
Only after the Board of Education had opened its main
case were the Appellants permitted the opportunity of
reopening their case for the limited purpose of calling one
of the landowners, Roy Bothwell (Tr. 200). That testimony
was received not as an opinion from one who had made an
informed analysis of the market or as that of a qualified
appraiser, but in the empty vacuum of a landowner, affected by bias and special interest. His lay statement that
the "property wasn't worth less than $525,000.00; absolute
minimum, as to value" was of no significance. Practically,
the Appellants' case was void of evidence. In light of this,
it is small wonder that the verdict of the jury was barely
$6,000.00 above the evaluation testimony of the Board of
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Education, $179,000.00. The resulting prejudice requires
that Appellants be accorded a new trial.
POINT IV.

THE COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN
DENYING TO APPELLANTS INTEREST AT
THE STATUTORY RATE OF 8% PER ANNUM
FROM THE DATE OF JUDGMENT ON THE
VERDICT UNTIL THE DATE OF DEPOSIT
MADE BY THE RESPONDENT.
On November 22, 1963, judgment on the verdict of the
jury was rendered in favor of Appellants and against the
Board of Education for the sum of $185,000.00; said judgment failed to specify that interest was due and owing at
8% from the date of judgment until the same was paid or
until a statutory deposit was made (R. 134). Appellants
objected to the December 10, 1963 Deposit of Judgment,
made by the Board on the ground that the same did not
include interest from the date of judgment. Upon hearing,
the trial court found that a judgment of condemnation is
not of the same nature as ordinary money judgments, that
interest was not owing, and thereupon overruled the objection (Proc. of Dec. 23, 1963, p. 30, R. 143). The lower
court erred by the order.
Questions of entitlement of interest in condemnation
suits have been before this Court. The cases of Oregon
Short Line R. Co. V. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 Pac. 732 and
Salt Lake & U. R. Co. V. Schramm, et al., 56 Utah 53, 189
Pac. 90 (1920) have established the principle that interest
at the normal rate of 6% per annum is not due upon the
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filing of a complaint in condemnation but is exacted prior
to judgment, only in the event that the condemning agency
possesses the property, pendente lite, under an order of
occupation. Again, in State of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263,
265 P. 2d 630, the Court declared that the condemnee is not
entitled to the recovery of interest from the date of service
of summons, there being no taking in law, even though the
demised premises are vacant and nonproductive. State
Road Comm. V. Danielson, et al, 122 Utah 220, 247 P. 2d
900 (1952), provides that in those instances wherein the
condemnor does obtain occupancy pendente lite, of the
condemned tract, the lawful rate of interest is 6% from
the date of the order of immediate occupancy to the "date
of judgment". The singular issue (whether interest is owing upon the judgment in condemnation at 8% from the
date of entry until paid or satisfied) raised by this appeal
has not been directly before the Court.
The judgment on the verdict entered by the trial court
on November 22, 1963, decreed a sum certain due the Appellants from the Board of Education. Its recitals were
consistent with other money judgments at law ordinarily
entered by a court of this State in an adversary proceeding. Like other judgments at law, it carries interest at
8% per annum from the date of entry. The statute relating
to the payment of interest is the touchstone of the issue:
"Interest on judgments. — Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and
shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties,
which shall be specified in the judgment; other
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of eight
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per cent per annum."
amended.

15-1-4 U. C. A. 1953, as

The statute circumscribes all in personam judgments.
McFarlane V. Winters, 114 Utah 149, 211 P. 2d 981 (1949).
The single exception made to the "eight percent" rule is
on judgments arising out of actions in contract. Under
the time-honored principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the legislative intent,
by implication, prescribes that compensation judgments in
condemnation bear interest at 8 percent until paid or until
a statutory deposit is effected.
In State Road Comm. V. Danielson, et ah, 122 Utah
220, 247 P. 2d 900 (1952), it was contended that the statute above-quoted (then codified as 44-0-4) was applicable from the date of occupancy by the condemning agency.
This Court rejected that argument, but in so doing, declared that the statute, now 15-1-4 U. C. A. 1953, was applicable from the time that damages in condemnation are
determined. The Court, writing through Wolfe, C. J., said:
"Admittedly, the amount of the damage sustained by the condemnee is not determined prior
to the entering of the order but is left for later
determination. Until such time as damages are determined, it is clear that there is no judgment which
will bear interest within the meaning of Sec. 440-4."
The alter ego of this rule is that upon determination of
damages and compensation and entry of judgment thereon,
the statute is operative. In Danielson, the judgment of the
trial court specified interest at 8% from occupancy by the
State of Utah until paid (Supreme Court No. 7752). By
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its opinion, this Court found error only to the extent that
interest was awarded "to the date of judgment". Interest
at 8% from the entry of judgment until payment thereof
was permitted to stand.
The rule set forth in Danielson is in harmony with the
weight of authority. In 29 C. J. S. 1380, Eminent Domain
Sec. 333a, it is written:
"Generally interest on the award is allowed and
judgments in condemnation proceedings have been
held to be within the meaning of statutes providing
for interest on judgments generally."
The significance of the trial court's ruling in this
matter extends far beyond interests of the parties hereto.
Counsel for Appellants are informed that the great bulk
of condemning authorities in the State of Utah have interpreted the statutes and decisions of this Court as requiring the payment of interest at 8% on condemnation
judgments and have, in fact, paid such interest for many
years last past. If this Court determines that interest is
not due and payaHe as herein contended and advanced, it
is submitted that it should also declare whether such ruling
has retroactive application to other causes wherein interest has been paid.
It is submitted that the trial court committed error
in overruling Appellants' objection to the Deposit made by
the Board of Education, and that the judgment of November 22, 1963, should carry interest at 8% until the Deposit
of Judgment was made.
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POINT V.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION FAILED TO
ESTABLISH EXISTENCE OF THE PUBLIC
NECESSITY FOR THE APPELLANTS' PROPERTY, OR THAT THE PROPOSED USE WAS
ONE PUBLIC IN NATURE.
Through discovery processes, the Board made known
the use it proposed to make of the Appellants' property—
general school needs and parking area for automobiles (R.
20-22). Plans for actual use had not been finalized. At
the pre-trial hearing in September, 1962, Appellants' counsel moved for summary judgment of dismissal on the
ground that immediate need was not evidenced and that
parking area was not an authorized public use. The pretrial court denied the motion and Appellants, to review
that Order, filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with
this Court; the same was also denied. At a subsequent pretrial proceeding in May, 1963, it was stipulated between
the Board and Counsel for landowners that the issue of the
power to condemn had been resolved in favor of the public
agency (R. 75). The order of pre-trial entered upon the
stipulation confirmed the power to condemn the lands of
Appellants and provided that from the order, the right of
appeal did not exist. Because present counsel did not represent the Appellants at that time, it is necessary to interpret the language adopted in said Order as to its content and meaning. With respect to that, present counsel
for Appellants believe this was intended:
1. it was understood by Mr. McCulloch, then
counsel, that the question of the Board's
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power to condemn had been determined adversely to Appellants at the September,
1962 hearing; and therefore,
2. no further issue would be raised as to that
point in the lower court.
The waiver of Appellants' right of appeal is less troublesome. It is a general rule that although the right of appellate review may be waived by a litigant, that so fundamental is that right to the judicial system and due process
of law, the waiver must be supported by adequate consideration. Curry V. Bacharach, 271 Pa. 364, 117 Atl. 435
(1921). The record does not reveal the existence of any
such consideration.
The power of condemnation must be underwritten by
satisfying statutory conditions. Specifically, the proposed
use must be authorized by law and public in nature. 7834-1 and 4, U. C. A. 1953; State Road Comm. v. Denver &
Rio Grande W. R. Co., 8 U. 2d 236, 332 P. 2d 926 (1958).
The declared public improvement must be located in a
manner compatible with the greatest public good and the
least private injury. 78-34-5 U. C. A. 1953. Lastly, the
need of the property condemned must be immediate. A
default by the condemnor in meeting any of these requirements should result in the condemnation complaint being
dismissed.
The Board of Education did not satisfy its burden of
proof with respect to these issues. The case of Wineger
et al. V. Aires, 371 Pa. 242, 89 A. 2d 521 (1952) is a ready
response to a school board who enters the real estate mar-
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ket to condemn without evidencing a public need for educational facilities.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed prejudicial error in refuse
ing to permit the opinion testimony of Grant E. Nielsen,
witness for Appellants, on market value and in rejecting
the proffered sales of comparable properties elicited by the
said witness. Appellants were prejudiced by said rulings
and prevented from establishing their case on market value
of the condemned premises. This Court should remand the
case to the lower court for a new trial on the issues of
compensation.
The lower court committed prejudicial error in holding
that the Board of Education was entitled to condemn and
expropriate the property of Appellants on the showing
made.
The trial court erred in law in failing to prescribe that
the judgment on the verdict carried interest at the statutory rate of 8% per annum. This court should rectify such
ruling by requiring the payment of such interest from the
date of judgment to the date that deposit of judgment was
tendered.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS
& LATIMER,
and
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.,
1003 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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